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CASE NOTES
Corporations—Employee Stock Options—Consideration.—Beard v.
Elster.'—A disinterested Board of Directors of American Airlines, Inc. for-
mulated a stock option plan pursuant to which certain key employees could
purchase the company's stock at a favorable rate at any time within five
years if, at the time of purchase, the employee was in the service of the
company. The plan was submitted to the stockholders and ratified by a
majority vote. In a derivative suit against the optionees, the plaintiff stock-
holder sought to compel the surrender to the corporation of the shares
purchased under the plan, contending that the plan constituted an unlaw-
ful gift of corporate assets in that it lacked consideration to the corporation.
Affidavits filed by the defendants declared that they had knowledge of the
plan prior to its adoption, that the plan induced them to remain in the
corporation's employ and that their salaries were below the average salaries
of employees in comparable companies. The Chancery Court denied de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court of Delaware
reversed. HELD: Where a disinterested board of directors in the exercise of
their independent business judgment determines both that a certain stock
option plan will be of benefit to the corporation and that within the plan
itself or in its surrounding circumstances there are sufficient assurances that
such benefit will actually accrue to the corporation and where such judgment
is one which reasonable businessmen might make, the plan is not open to
attack as an unlawful gift of corporate assets.
Because of highly favorable tax treatment, 2 stock option plans have
become, of late, a popular and efficacious means of supplementing the com-
pensation of select employees. 3 While executive compensation plans have
always been open to shareholders' derivative suits challenging them as con-
stituting "gifts of the corporate assets," 4 a particularly annoying thorn has
been the 1952 Delaware Supreme Court decision of Kerbs v. California
Eastern Airways!' It was upon the authority of that case that the Vice-
Chancellor in the lower court held the option plan in the instant case to be
In the Kerbs case a stock option plan was adopted by a board that was
"interested," since five of the eight directors were ultimate beneficiaries under
the plan. As approved by a majority of the stockholders, the plan provided
that options pursuant to it could be exercised at any time within a period
of five years. Moreover, such options could be exercised within six months
I 160 A.2d 731 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1960).
2 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 421, permits executives to postpone the tax
on profits from "restricted" stock options until disposal of the stock purchased under
the option, and, in some cases, provides capital gains rather than ordinary income
treatment of option profits.
3 See Patton, Current Practices in Executive Compensation, 29 Harv. Bus. Rev.
56 (1951).
4 Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (Ch. 1948);
Sandler v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 32 Del. Ch. 46, 79 A.2d 606 (Ch. 1951).
5 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
6 Elster v. American Airlines, 148 A.2d 343 (Del. Ch. 1959).
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after the termination of the employment of the optionee. The court held the
plan to be invalid, stating, "the validity of a stock option plan under which
selected personnel of a corporation may acquire a stock interest in the cor-
poration depends directly upon the existence of consideration to the corpora-
tion and the inclusion in the plan of conditions, or the existence of circum-
stances which may be expected to insure that the contemplated consideration
will in fact pass to the corporation."' Since an employee might have resigned
and yet have been allowed to exercise his option within six months, the plan
was ". . deficient because it is not reasonably calculated to insure that the
defendant [corporation] will receive the contemplated benefit," i.e., the re-
tention of the services of the optionees.
The case had a disconcerting effect" on the corporate bar, not only be-
cause its use of the word "consideration" seemed to require a contractual
arrangement between company and optionee, but also because it implied
that the court intended more closely to scrutinize the reasonableness of the
relation between the value given and the value received, an area of decision
usually reserved for the business judgment of management.'" Indeed, in
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.," a case decided as a companion to and
under the rule of Kerbs, where again an interested board had approved a
stock option plan which was later ratified by a majority of the shareholders,
the Supreme Court ordered a remand to the Chancery Court to consider
whether the anticipated benefit to the corporation was fairly related to the
value of the plan. Thus while the legal consideration necessary for a simple
contract might be satisfied by the proverbial "peppercorn," insofar as stock
option plans were concerned, apparently something more was required. The
Kerbs opinion was in obvious need of clarification.
The instant case of Beard v. Elster12
 purports to be that clarification.
The court first directed its attention to its use of the word "consideration"
in phrasing the rule in Kerbs and admitted that "the choice of this word was
possibly ill-advised since it is regarded, apparently, by some as a measurable
quid pro quo.' 3 . It, of course, by the very nature of things, cannot be
that. It is incapable of measurement except in terms of business judgment
that the plan will spur employees on to greater efforts which in the long run
will benefit the corporation.'" 4
After reviewing the holdings of the Kerbs and Gottlieb cases the court
7
 Supra note 5, at 74, 90 A.2d 652 at 656.
s Id. at 75, 90 A.2d 652 at 656.
9 See Dwight, Employee Stock—Option Plans: The Clydesdale Rule, 52 Colum.
L. Rev. 1003 (1952).
10 Clamitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1947).
11
 33 Del. Ch. 82, 90 A.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
12 Supra note 1.
73
 Here the court cited Lieberman v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1959).
An interesting point here is that the judge who in the Lieberman case misconstrued the
rule in Kerbs was the same judge who wrote the Kerbs decision—Justice Wolcott. To
compound the interest of the situation, the judge who is now observing all this mis-
construing, the author of Beard v. Elster, is the same=Justice Wolcott.
14 Supra note 1, at 736.
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declared that it was reaffirming the rule of Kerbs and stated that, "All stock
option plans must be tested against the requirement that they contain con-
ditions, or that surrounding circumstances are such, that the corporation
may reasonably expect to receive the contemplated benefit from the grant of
the options.'" In addition, this anticipated benefit is to be reasonably re-
lated to the value of the options granted. A full application of this "test"
to the stock option plan involved would seem to require the same result of
invalidity found in Kerbs, for factually it is very difficult to distinguish the
two plans. Just as the optionee in Kerbs might resign and still exercise his
option within six months, there was nothing whatsoever in the plan in Beard
to prevent the optionee from exercising his option and then resigning. In
both cases the companies would just as surely be deprived of their employees'
service and with the same degree of immediacy. This, in substance, was
the plaintiff stockholder's contention, and in view of what appeared to be
the paramount consideration of the court in Kerbs, it seemed sound. At
this point, however, the court invoked the familiar "sound business judg-
ment rule" which in other cases has protected actions taken by a distinter-
ested board with regard to the disposition of corporate assets.'° After
considering the facts filed in the defendants' affidavits and finding that the
plan was one on which reasonable businessmen could differ, the court decided
that it was precluded from second-guessing the sound business judgment of
a disinterested board as to the fairness of the plan to the corporation. The
plan was valid and Kerbs and Gottlieb were to be distinguished in that there
the boards were interested.
Thus, although the court states that "all" stock option plans are to be
measured by the Kerbs "test," one wonders, in light of the extreme emphasis
accorded the fact of director disinterest, whether the court is refusing to
apply any test to stock option plans formulated by a disinterested board.
Or, at least, does it apply any test other than to inquire whether the directors
were interested or disinterested?
However, even this latter interpretation of the case cannot be taken
with any high degree of certainty for the opinion is vague as to what weight
the court actually placed on the facts declared in the optionee's affidavits.
While the fact of director disinterest is to be given "utmost consideration,"
the facts of the affidavits are still to be "considered." What the court would
do with a case that did not possess such supporting facts is unclear. The
court might find the plan to be valid, stating again that they will not second-
guess the judgment of a disinterested board, or they might hold it to be
invalid and distinguish it from Beard v. Elster in that here there were such
supporting facts. At any rate the case represents a substantial retreat for
the Delaware Supreme Court from its harsh position originally taken in
Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways.
JOHN J. MADDEN
15 Supra note I, at 737.
16 See, e.g., Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms, 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
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